



About PlusD

Browse	by creat	tion date
1966	1972	1973
1974	1975	1976
1977	1978	1979
1985	1986	1987
1988	1989	1990
1991	1992	1993
1994	1995	1996
1997	1998	1999
2000	2001	2002
2003	2004	2005
2006	2007	2008
2009 2010		

Browse by Classification UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECRET UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET//NOFORN **Browse by Handling**

Restriction

EXDIS - Exclusive Distribution Only ONLY - Eyes Only **LIMDIS - Limited Distribution** Only NODIS - No Distribution (other than to persons indicated) **STADIS - State Distribution** Only **CHEROKEE - Limited to** senior officials NOFORN - No Foreign Distribution LOU - Limited Official Use SENSITIVE -BU - Background Use Only

CONDIS - Controlled

Distribution

US - US Government Only

Browse by TAGS

US PFOR PGOV PREL ETRD UR OVIP ASEC OGEN CASC PINT EFIN BEXP OEXC EAID CVIS OTRA ENRG OCON ECON NATO PINS GE JA UK IS MARR PARM UN EG FR PHUM SREF EAIR MASS APER SNAR PINR EAGR PDIP AORG PORG MX TU ELAB IN CA SCUL CH IR IT XF GW EINV TH TECH SENV OREP KS EGEN PEPR MILI SHUM KISSINGER, HENRY A PL BR RP GR SF AFSP SP PTER MOPS SA UNGA CGEN ESTC SOPN RO LE TGEN PK AR NI OSCI CI EEC VS YO AFIN OECD SY IZ ID VE TPHY TW AS PBOR

Media Organizations

Australia - The Age

Argentina - Pagina 12

Brazil - Publica

Bulgaria - Bivol

Egypt - Al Masry Al Youm

Greece - Ta Nea

Guatemala - Plaza Publica Haiti - Haiti Liberte India - The Hindu Italy - L'Espresso Italy - La Repubblica Lebanon - Al Akhbar Mexico - La Jornada Spain - Publico Sweden - Aftonbladet UK - AP **US - The Nation**

PUBLIC LIBRARY OF US DIPLOMACY

SALEH DISCUSSES SECURITY CONCERNS WITH AMBASSADOR

Specified Search

View Map

Make Timegraph

View Tags

Canonical ID: 05SANAA894_a

Image Library

Handling Restrictions -- Not Assigned --Character Count: 6699

Executive Order: -- Not Assigned --TAGS: COUNTER | DEMOCRATIC | KPAO -Public Affairs Office | MASS - Military and Defense Affairs--Military

Original Classification: SECRET

Assistance and Sales | PGOV -Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs | PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | REFORM | Terrorism -Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism | YM - Yemen Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --Office Origin: -- N/A or BLANK --Office Action: -- N/A or Blank --From: YEMEN SANA"A To: -- N/A or Blank --

Date: 2005 April 10, 13:46 (Sunday)

Locator: TEXT ONLINE Concepts: -- Not Assigned --

Current Classification: SECRET

Share

Markings: -- Not Assigned --

Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --

Type: TE - Telegram (cable)

Print

Show Headers

C. IIR 6 906 0111 05

Content | Raw content | Metadata

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.5 b and d.

B. IIR 6 906 0112 15

1. (C) Summary. President Saleh convoked Ambassador the morning of April 9 to discuss renewed fighting in Saada.

rebels in the north. Reiterating an argument he used during last summer's fighting, Saleh said, "This is your fight we are fighting." Ambassador turned the focus to the current threat against Americans. They discussed ways the U.S. could help improve the situation in Saada, as well as timing for a potential Saleh visit to Washington to meet President Bush. End Summary. Saleh in the Dark on Ansar as-Sunna Cell

2. (S) Saleh opened the meeting with a complaint that travel

Saleh immediately launched into requests for USG political

and military support for ROYG efforts to defeat al-Houthi

advisories, warden messages, and Embassy closures were not helpful to ROYG efforts to quell renewed fighting between

security forces and al-Houthi's "Believing Youth."

Ambassador quickly explained that while we were indeed

are working closely with the Ministry of Interior, the

Political Security Organization (PSO) and the National

4. (C) Returning to the crisis in Saada, Saleh asked

Ambassador for a strong message of political support from the

"al-Ayam," condemning violence against the state and calling

U.S. DCM noted his statement to independent Arabic daily

for calm and dialogue. "Forget about al-Ayam," said Saleh

with a wave of his hand, "I want it printed in (state-run)

al-Thawra and reported on the wires." Ambassador said we

concerned about continued fighting and the potential spread of the insurgency, the Embassy is closed today because of a specific and dangerous threat unrelated to events in Saada. 3. (S) Ambassador remarked that there was very specific information about a Yemeni Ansar as-Sunna member Kanaan, who returned from Iraq with clear intentions to attack U.S. as well as ROYG interests. Shaking his head, Saleh asked for clarification on this individual and the threat he posed. We

Security Board (NSB) on this threat, Ambassador replied, and find them to be extremely cooperative and responsive. Ambassador suggested the President request a brief from his nephew, NSB Chief Ammar. Saleh said he would, and emphasized his commitment to cooperate closely and do whatever necessary to remove the threat. "Be careful, by all means, for a week or so," he said, "but don't worry all is under control." "We are Fighting Your Fight"

would explore the possibility of issuing a strong statement to a wider audience. Saleh nodded, saying USG moral support was required, "please get your European friends to also express their support and stress the link between al-Houthi and international terrorism." Saleh accused his opposition of exploiting the Sadaa crises to weaken the regime. "They call me an American agent," he exclaimed. 5. (C) Saleh said he had offered to end the fighting if the rebels stopped chanting "death to the U.S and death to Israel." Repeating his theme from last summer's conflict, Saleh said "we are fighting your fight, they are anti-U.S., anti-Israel, and pro-Iranian, whereas we are your friend."

6. (C) Describing the situation in Saada, Saleh exclaimed,

(hameer)!" Saleh assured Ambassador, that despite stubborn

weeks. Saleh reported that 49 security forces and 100 rebels

"They are surrounded but continue to fight like donkeys

rebel fighting, "everything will be fine" in a matter of

situation was "under control and reported that 150 rebels

had been killed in fighting. He characterized rebel forces as 700 strong. (Note: Interior Minister Alimi agreed the

"They Continue to Fight like Donkeys"

were "taken care of" (ref A). Reports on the situation in Saada from CSF-CTU soldiers in the field are less are optimistic (ref B). Throughout last summer's June-September fighting, the President and ROYG officials routinely claimed they would win the battle in a matter of days or weeks. The number of 700 may be high, given the attrition of al-Houthi forces due to death or capture from last summers engagement. End Note). 7. (C) Saleh asked the Ambassador to expedite ROYG requests for M113 APCs and HMWWVS, saying, "they are needed urgently." Ambassador replied that we are anxious to help; materiel assistance, however, even on an expedited basis would take time. He assured the President that we would make every effort to speed up delivery. The USG can provide other

assistance, such as intelligence sharing, on a faster basis,

8. (C) Ambassador shared USG concerns that al-Houthi related

attacks targeting military leaders in downtown Sanaa. Saleh

violence is spreading, noting the recent string of grenade

confirmed these events were connected with Saada, and told

Ambassador that seven to eight individuals involved in these

if asked, Ambassador added.

Spread of Saada Related Violence

terrorist acts against the ROYG had been arrested. He also said he hard learned that the captured individuals were planning attacks against the children of military commanders and possibly Americans. "The al-Houthi movement has connections across the country -- this is a sectarian fight," he said. (Note: Recent, likely Saada related, grenade attacks against MOD officials in Sanaa reported septel. ROYG efforts to deploy regular forces to Ma'rib and al-Jawf to preempt the unrest from spreading beyond Saada reported ref C. End Note). Saleh Prefers Fall Visit to Washington 9. (C) Saleh told Ambassador his preference is to visit

with Secretary Rice, the Pentagon, and other agency heads, Saleh raised the issue of visiting the last week of September vice October, to avoid the beginning of Ramadan. Ambassador

said the White House was cognizant of the Ramadan conflict, and would pass on his request. Krajeski

Washington in the Fall, waving off a short June visit as an


option. Preferring a longer visit with opportunities to meet



Your role is important:



WikiLeaks maintains its robust independence through your contributions.



Top


Help Expand The Public Library of US Diplomacy


Please see


https://shop.wikileaks.org/donate to learn about all ways to donate.



an international organisation







anonymising network that

